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hard work and those who lead must ever call back and urge upward. Meantime, the "affairs of life are neither to be wept over nor laughed at, but they are to be understood"; and those who understand can steadily help forward.

It is this disgust that we feel for the spy and the informer, partly due to our own sense of imperfection, partly due to our sympathy for anyone in trouble, and mainly to those deeper and more primitive feelings of fair play and personal loyalty which stand most in the way of good democratic government. Just as a man cannot be a good cosmopolitan and humanitarian until he has first been a good nationalist, so he cannot be devoted to abstract social ethics until he has served his apprenticeship in personal ethics. To prematurely act on general ethical grounds is to destroy the very foundations of the moral nature. And so we must be patient with children, and university students, and with ourselves until we grow up to social manhood and womanhood.

EARL BARNES.

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE RATIONALISTIC ATTITUDE.

The fact that a person is specially interested in one object tends generally to prevent him from having an interest in any other object; or one might put it that the lines along which we customarily recollect or think tend to exclude other lines of recollection or thought. A man, in this condition, unaware as he is usually of the factors which determine his line of thought, and unsuspecting of the peculiarities of the psychic mechanism, feels convinced that he cannot possibly be mistaken, because, as it seems to him, all the evidence points to his being right. Yet if he would only consider that many of his neighbors who differ from him in opinion are as certain of their beliefs as he is, he might begin to suspect that there is something at fault with his psychic mechanism which, although he means to be impartial, causes him to recollect only evidence which favors his theory. His universe of thought, in other words, is not so

complete and connected as the universe itself, but is rather a tiny planet replete with peculiarities which divide him from other similar planets.

Take, for instance, the average Rationalist. He is so impressed with the evils of superstition; he has thought so much about the growth and history of religions; he has so often observed the danger of relying on authority; he has become so convinced of the perniciousness of priesthood—that to him human salvation appears vitally connected with mankind's abandonment of superstition. Abolish superstition, abolish supernatural sanctions and explanations, and men, having become worshipers of reason, will, he argues, live rational lives. The triumph of Rationalism would, accordingly, mean the triumph of the humanities and the graces. Men, being guided solely by reason, would be rational, and rationality, it is contended, is the distinctive mark of a human being.

Consistently with this the Rationalist eloquently and enthusiastically presses the claims of reason. An appeal to the emotions is to him an outrage on reason, an introduction to superstition, and a reliance on an incompetent tribunal. Only reason has a right, he holds, to decide any issue, and only the reason, therefore, may be appealed to. To appeal to the emotions is to appeal to prejudice. The Rationalist deals similarly with the "practical" reformer. To act appears to him a dangerous thing, unless the actions follow from the demands of reason, and as the thraldom of superstition is said to be the root of all evil, the reformer's task is chiefly to help men to throw off that thraldom. The emotions, then, are not to be trusted, nor is the will or the impulse to action.

Such an attitude is plausible rather than reasonable. Those eloquent panegyrics and impassioned glorifications of reason are surely emotional in character. The lover of reason manifestly loves reason, and is not love an emotion? We have only to listen to the praise of reason and to the scorn poured on the emotions and the will, to learn how strongly moved by emotion the Rationalist is. Besides, it is not only that he strongly feels what he utters; but his chief aim is to produce similar emotions in his hearers. The enthusiasm he raises, the rounds

of applause he receives, and the converts he makes, clearly show that he excites the emotions of his audience, and as he also desires to stir them to action, he appeals to their will, too. A wholly "reasonable" Rationalist is an inconceivable being. His state of mind would argue that he is not interested in reason; that to him it is indifferent whether men reason or not; and that he does not care whether reason triumphs or is trampled in the dust. He himself would have no recourse to reason, except accidentally.

This criticism will seem less paradoxical and more obvious when we inquire into the nature and purport of reason. It is, briefly, this: there exist within us certain needs or functional tendencies, innate and acquired, and these, owing to opposing obstacles, can seldom be satisfied directly. Consequently the end is attained by a more or less prolonged and circuitous process or search or turning over of memories, and this process we term the process of reasoning. To put it differently, we must know what to do if we are to act effectively, and hence we seek to know. This primitive process of knowing for the sake of acting is only modified in two ways. A more or less strong desire to acquire knowledge independently of action may grow up, or the passion for knowledge may be such that it obscures every other need. These modifications, however, by no means challenge the fundamental proposition that needs are the explanation of our having recourse to reasoning, for if the psychic mechanism were perfect, answers to questions would be immediate and reason would consequently not even be suspected of existing; besides which there is the fact to be noted that no one would reason if there were no desire to reason.

The preceding remarks do not prove the unimportance of the rationalistic attitude. It may still be true, and is true, that unreasoning action plays great havoc with human welfare. Wherever an issue is complicated, and issues are frequently in that condition, and wherever the desires of men conflict, and they often do conflict, the consistent Rationalist will plead the imperative necessity of not rushing to conclusions, since such a method defeats the object aimed at. When

a question of the correctness of a statement or of a line of reasoning arises, he will insist that no emotion but that of the love of truth should be appealed to. And, generally speaking, it will be his mission to point out how necessary it is that the demands of reason should be respected.

The Rationalist, then, has no sufficient case against what is not reason, for the Moralist as naturally appeals to man's love of goodness, the Artist to our reverence for the beautiful, and the Statesman to the necessity for following up sentiment and reason by action. The only limitation we may make is to say that nothing within us should be encouraged or appealed to which has a tendency to lower or to deteriorate vitality or the fullest individual and social life. Consequently, the appeals to self-interest, to prudence, to the love of justice and kindness, to the love of nature and art, are each in their way, no more and no less, as reasonable as the appeal to the love of reason. Let it only be remembered that the appeal to reason is an appeal to the love of reason, and the inconsequence will be evident of making an appeal to the love of reason when it is a question of the love of goodness or the love of the beautiful.

We have thus far silently assumed that the Rationalist of whom we are speaking, is thoroughly consistent in his rationalism. As a matter of fact, his love of reason is far from being a love of reason as such. To the student of mind it is clear that he hates falsehood less than he hates some particular theological or philosophical systems. The triumph of reason means for this typical Rationalist, the annihilation of certain supernaturalistic systems. He does not often have in view a religion which will be true to reason, nor does he generally think of how to prevent the development of a new supernaturalistic system. His attitude is chiefly negative, though it must be admitted that a negative attitude is not without its value. He seems to think that the death of supernaturalism means the coming of reason into its birthright.

This question is too important to be disposed of in a sentence. It is the old story of the common belief that the killing of one falsehood implies the killing of all falsehood. Naturalism being triumphant, the Rationalist is inclined to reason that

with its triumph justice, beauty and truth have triumphed. He does not see that the supernaturalism he attacks is but a kind of crude naturalism, and that, therefore, the exclusion of the gods and spirits he objects to may make little difference to human welfare. Savages have their medicine men and popular supernaturalism has its mediating priests and its prayers. Are we much nearer the reign of reason when these are done away with, and quacks innumerable, with no supernaturalistic pretensions, take their place? It is appalling when one considers the vast amount of neglect of health and encouragement of illness which is due to the industriously and effectively advertised stories of quick and safe cures for any and every ill. Prayer to a non-existent power could surely not do more harm. On the side of prevention of ills there are similar changes observable to-day. It is no more the gods who are believed to protect us; it is an endless number of systems of diet, exercise and what not. Here is one man who offers to supply us with iron nerves; another recommends a brain food which is to make all fear of overwork or need of prudence superfluous; and still another tempts us with a beverage which makes it needless to have higher wages or decent workshops and homes. Then there are extreme Anarchists, Individualists, Single-Taxers, and Socialists, who are ready to save mankind at once and for ever. Lastly, granting laudable exceptions, we have a Press, fickle as a child, shallow as a puddle, narrow as a bigoted sect, created by wealth and serving wealth, aping impartiality and wisdom, and doing its best to crush out or ignore everything which is profound or is not sensational. Under these circumstances Naturalism as such is of little assistance to human progress. Our case is that men should not only believe in law; but that they should be deeply impressed with the truth that the general facts of outward and of human nature only become evident after exhaustive research. Such a belief would cut off with one movement of the blade the many hundred heads of modern quackery. It would make obvious that the universal panaceas of to-day, religious and other, are to be ranked with the beliefs in witches and demons, and we should learn that human nature is organic and com-

plex, consists of many parts, and that no single remedy could put everything in order once for all. Moreover, the belief we have spoken of would convince men that we are yet far from having reached the degree of culture which would enable us to discover universal remedies or preventatives. A mere triumph over supernaturalism, therefore, supposing supernaturalism to be indefensible, may be of small importance for human progress, and lovers of their kind have no grounds for hoping that the overthrow of the popular supernaturalism will kill that uninformed and inert spirit which gave birth to it.

There is also another sense in which the average Rationalist is not a true Rationalist. If he were interested in reason as such, he would urge its claims in every direction—in the sciences generally, in the realms of ethics, æsthetics, psychology, in personal and business matters, and in economics and politics. He would impartially press the demands of truth everywhere. Loyal to his ideal, he would learn that not only in matters supernatural, but in all matters, the claims of reason are treated with scant respect. He would become a consistent Rationalist, in touch with every live issue, one who would point out that conclusions, no matter what the subject, should have reasoned foundations. He would take interest in politics, in ethics, and the other great departments of life.

The search for truth is, in its essential features, wholly guided by practical considerations. That is, instead of piling up colossal mountains of facts, we seek for generalisations which make the piling up superfluous; and instead of observing and noting interminable changes, we endeavor to find the general facts which sum up these changes. Except for this practical aspect, we should be collecting a vast mass of detail which would neither illumine our ideas of the world we live in nor assist us in our practical life. Science, on the contrary, as we know, achieves what an impartial method would fail to accomplish—it makes man wiser and more powerful.

For this reason the consistent Rationalist will more especially urge the claims of reason in those subjects in which the neglect of reason is most conspicuous, and it is most likely in accordance with this that the typical Rationalist wars against super-

stitution until he fails to see any other enemy of the human race and until everything is swallowed up in reason and reason itself is swallowed up in hatred of superstition.

There is still another aspect to be considered. It is said that faith forms the support of reason, because, it is argued, there comes a point when we cannot pursue a question any further. The alternative to this, of ever-receding answers to questions, is one which destroys the value of reason itself, since it robs it of permanent foundations. If we do not consider such extremes, the problem meets us yet in another form. Except in pure mathematics and the exactest portions of the physical sciences, we never know all the conditions of an intricate problem and must, therefore go beyond the limits of exact reason, and take refuge in incompletely verified conclusions. In ordinary life the more intimate connections of facts are certainly hidden from us, and we are compelled to direct ourselves almost altogether by probabilities or, more often, by the rule of thumb which social experience has suggested. A reason for our action, at least so far as the satisfied reason is concerned, is almost invariably not only absent, but extremely difficult to discover, since our whole conduct is closely related and is not yet understood as a totality, there being as yet no science of conduct. All these considerations should teach us not to press the claims of reason with too great vehemence, though the Rationalist cannot too strongly emphasize the fact that scientific research into matters of conduct is one of the most crying needs of our time.

Lastly, there is the fact that the needs of our nature create their truths, in the sense that only certain facts are by us selected and formed into a suitable system. There is no ethics except for the ethical man; no hygiene except for the prudent man; no beauty except for him who appreciates the beautiful; and no reason in any definite sense except for him who loves consistency and general facts. The world as given to the senses is a chaos, and it is only judicious pondering which enables us to see an order behind the chaos, or rather to view things in such an arbitrary manner that we read order where there is chaos. As I look out of the window, everything ap-

pears as in a dream; the leafless boughs are shaking—I know not why; there are curious noises which I regard as due to carts passing and children shouting in a neighboring playground; upright things are moving along (things which I call human beings), coming I know not whence and going I know not whither. Everything in connection with the senses happens haphazard. Nay more, the very individual objects we see—the objects about which we reason—are themselves the result of a psychological selective process, independently of which they do not exist; that is, we build up objects as we build up truths.

Specialisation is necessary; but it too frequently ends in over-specialisation. However, while it is bad that people should regard their particular opinions as being of matchless importance, it would be worse if they would not specialise at all and tried to be equally interested in everything. If all men were Jacks of all trades, not only would they be masters of none, but there would be no occupations whatever. The narrow interest which over-emphasizes itself is not to be abolished in favor of a quite general interest; but men must be taught to reconcile their interests with the interests of others. That is to say, to make a special application, the true Rationalist has his place. It is important at the present day to urge the claims of reason, especially in religious affairs, and it is well that those who feel strongly about this matter should devote themselves more particularly to this object. The Rationalist can but gain in influence and in respect if he admits that not only the popular supernaturalism, but a light-hearted naturalism, threatens to dethrone reason; that reason is to be honored in every department of life and knowledge, and not only in matters of religion; and that the business of reason is not to supplant or domineer over feeling and will, but to insist that it should have its rightful and honorable place at their side.

We may agree consequently that the Pragmatist and the defender of Faith are justified in so far as they insist that one may reasonably revere other things than knowledge and that a critical attitude and the pursuit of truth do not sum up the aim of life, and the Rationalist will be justified in so far as he

contends that life's complexity and the diversity of men's wants make it imperative that the reason shall be called in to investigate and to decide upon the many diverging claims put forward. Pragmatism thus ceases to be a wild man's country where all opinions are regarded as equally well-grounded, and Rationalism no more makes war on legitimate feelings and impulses. The fullest harmonious development of the individual and of society becomes accordingly the aim of the Pragmatist as of the Rationalist.

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THE HEART OF MR. SPENCER'S ETHICS.

Many readers of Mr. Spencer's "Autobiography," already familiar with his philosophical writings, must have found themselves asking this question: Was Mr. Spencer's mind supremely interested in that process of universal evolution which he devoted his life to explaining, or in the mystery of that Creative Power which the human intellect fails to comprehend, or in the problem of human conduct conceived as man's conscious adaptation to the conditions of his existence? One must have studied Mr. Spencer's works and his life with more than usual diligence to answer this question with assurance.

It can, however, be answered. Numerous expressions throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy" indicate that Mr. Spencer regarded the formulation of a system of scientific ethics as the crowning achievement of intellectual effort, while the "Autobiography" and the personal recollections of his friends afford convincing evidence that from his earliest manhood until his death Mr. Spencer was ready under all circumstances to endure any hardship or to make any sacrifice that might be necessary to square his acts with the principles that he professed. If further proof were desired that Mr. Spencer regarded conduct as the supreme concern of mankind, it might be found in the unconcealed pain with which, in old age, he viewed the revival of militarism throughout the civilized world.